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“Order is the Best We can Hope For”:  





“The civilized have created the wretched, quite coldly and deliberately,  
and do not intend to change the status quo.”  
 —James Baldwin1	  	  
The spectacular modes of violence witnessed within contemporary politics offer a persistent 
challenge to the end-of-history proclamations at the end of the previous century.2 The 
imagined resolution of social antagonism that was presumed to follow the fall of the Berlin 
Wall promised a global order in which liberal, capitalist democracy would provide a cohering 
anchor for all nations and cultures to co-exist within a single universal. Rivalry between 
sovereign nations had been accredited as the source of murderous global conflict in what had 
been the bloodiest century in human history up to the end of the Cold War; with the twenty-
first century heralding the suppression of that rivalry, it was anticipated that the violence 
would dissipate under the glare of a shared adherence to rule of law. However, the 
preponderance of increasingly spectacular images of violence delivered by contemporary 
politics and reflected in our popular culture troubles this presupposition. The sight of the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center on fire that has been seared into our collective memory is 
read as confirming the end of “the end of history.”3 The “War on Terror” launched in the 
aftermath of 9/11 has continued to remind us of the return of a violence that was never truly 
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contained, particularly with the images of Lynndie England’s Abu Ghraib or of the capture of 
Saddam Hussein. Critical scholars have responded by taking up the task of unpacking the 
insights that the War on Terror can offer us with regard to the contemporary workings of 
violence within the modern global legal order.4 However, absent from this critical 
engagement has been another abstract war that has both preceded and paralleled the War on 
Terror: the “War on Drugs.” The task I will undertake in this article is to address this absence 
by drawing some insights into the structuring of contemporary violence and its operative 
function within our proclaimed peaceful global legal order. I will first examine, the legal 
architecture that governs the War on Drugs and second, the representation of this 
inexhaustible war within popular culture, particular through Denis Villeneuve’s 2015 film 
Sicario. Sicario, a cinematic interrogation of the irresolvable conflict between drug 
enforcement agents and narcotraffickers along the Mexican-American border, captures the 
ways in which the drug war offers a telling instance of law underwritten by violence. The 
drug war and its damning representation in films like Sicario offer a significant challenge to 
the presuppositions of the universal triumph of the rule of law heralding the realization of 
universal peace, for the legal project of universal drug prohibition requires reconciling an 
expansion of law with an expansion of violence. I will illustrate how the drug war reveals a 
violence that is not only present within the legal order but in fact constitutes its very ground; 
a violence that takes a (re)generative form due to the way in which the construction of its 
victims imbues it with legitimacy. I term this violence “sacrificial violence,” following the 
work of philosophical anthropologist Rene Girard. 	  
 
The Drug War as Catastrophe  
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To intimately associate the violence of the War on Drugs with the workings of the 
international legal order is to call into question a primary orthodoxy of the law: that the law 
acts as an external limit on violence. Orthodoxy prescribes that we submit to the authority of 
the law through faith in its ability to restrict the human inclination to violence, thereby laying 
the basis on which a social order can be founded. Through conceptions about the arrogation 
of the rule of law so as to function in a single global sphere that came to fruition over the 
course of the twentieth century, the equation between this extension of the rule of law and the 
extension of peace was taken as self-evident. Such an assumption is demonstrated in the 
founding document of the contemporary international community, the UN Charter, in which 
a global legal order is imagined as produced through the promise of international law to 
insure a universal peace.5 
 However, the empirical consequences of international laws prohibiting drugs trouble 
any such easy equation between the extension of the rule of law and the extension of peace.6 
The War on Drugs has produced little more than the same mass of casualties that all wars 
tend to produce. The drug war has visited catastrophe upon untold millions; it has been the 
cause of social death (through mass imprisonment) and material death (through violent state 
enforcement) throughout the globe. For example, in the United States of America more than 
half of all Federal prisoners have been incarcerated due to drug offences,7 while 
internationally, the U.S. is openly engaged in targeted assassinations of suspected drug-
traffickers.8 In Rio de Janeiro, where law enforcement is understood by authorities to be “a 
war against gangs and drug traffickers,” on-duty police officers are estimated to kill at a rate 
of three people per day.9 At the height of the Colombian drug wars, the annual murder rate 
was one per 1,000 of the population.10 In addition to the deaths, there were 300,000 
Colombians driven from their homes.11 Stories of death and displacement are repeated across 
the Americas, where indigenous peoples routinely lose their livelihoods through crop 
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eradication and land seizure programs invoked to enforce drug laws.12 And in Mexico, the 
region that currently occupies the popular imagination as the epicenter of the crisis of the 
drug war, as illustrated by Sicario, murders between 2006 and 2012 totaled 60,000, a number 
widely accredited to an escalation of the drug war.13 The scale of the violence is better 
appreciated when compared with the 14,728 civilian deaths in Afghanistan over the same 
period, while that nation was at war.14 Even a cursory review of such statistics invites us to 
question how this devastation that has emerged during an era marking the triumph of a global 
rule of law can be reconciled with the promise of universal peace contained in the founding 
document of the modern international legal order. The challenge is only amplified when we 
consider the futility of the violence of the drug war in achieving its own stated goals. 
Through its universal prohibition of the drug trade, the law explicitly stated its aim to bring 
about “A Drug-Free World.”15 This ambition emphasizes a belief in the omnipotence of the 
law. International drug prohibition held that it was within the power of the law to conform a 
world to its word, that a law prohibiting drugs could universally reduce and finally abolish 
the production, and therefore the use, of substances drawn from naturally-occurring plants 
such as coca, opium, and cannabis (outside of the narrowly-defined realms of the medical and 
the scientific).16 The idea was that the law would, through its force, suffocate the supply of 
drugs, while, concurrently, the authority of the law would inspire a reduction in demand by 
discursively constructing these substances to be transgressive.17 In practice, the defeat of this 
ideal has been outright. Even an institution invested in proclaiming the success of prohibition, 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, had to admit the durability of the drugs trade, 
estimating that between 162 million and 324 million people used illicit drugs recreationally in 
2012.18 Following prohibition, the continuing prevalence of drug use has led to the trade in 
illegal drugs emerging as among the most lucrative of all global criminal industries, 
accounting for one fifth of global criminal proceeds, by the UN’s own admission (rising to 
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half if tax evasion is discounted).19 This is all despite over $100 billion per annum being 
spent globally on enforcing the War on Drugs.20 And of course, the costs in terms of bodies, 
as detailed above, outstrips even this financial loss.  
 Despite these figures, many still do not recognize the War on Drugs as a catastrophe. 
According to the generals of this drug war, “who dream of a world free of drugs,” the 
conventions’ “success . . . is undeniable.”21 For these agents, any negative consequences of 
the attempts to enforce prohibition are seen to reinforce the dangers of the drugs, rather than 
indicate any failure of law. Their response to the evident failures of the drug war has been to 
call for more law: more enforcement programs, more institutions, greater surveillance 
powers, stronger punishments for those who defy the law. Outside of their consideration is 
the potential of the law to actually be implicated in the ills of the drug war. The dissociation 
of the catastrophe from the actual law itself is also echoed by some critics of prohibition, who 
claim that the drug war is an “approach [that] might be tempting in theory but in practice is 
murderous and self-defeating.”22 The latter understanding portrays prohibition as a 
benevolent project, albeit one that, due to unforeseen complications, has created worse harms 
than those it initially aimed to address.  
 Rejecting both of these perspectives on the War on Drugs, I propose a focus on the 
ways in which the violence detailed above is actually inscribed in the law, and I further seek 
to illuminate the function that such violence serves in constituting and sustaining the 
international legal order. The drug war must be reinterpreted. It must no longer be held as a 
necessary undertaking or as an unfortunate misstep in international law’s teleological march 
toward universal peace, but instead should be read as an instance of a recurrent struggle that 
gives the global legal order its very form.  
 
Law’s Violence 
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To begin to address the question of reconciling the violence of the drug war with the 
workings of a peaceful legal order requires recognition that the violence of the drug war is 
not a violence that is the opposite of law—after all, it is spoken into existence by the law. Yet 
neither can this violence be understood as simply all that the law is, since that would 
destabilize a law understood to self-authorize the peaceful order of a community. Therefore, 
the evidential problem of the violence of the War on Drugs requires a far more challenging 
analysis of the tension between order and violence within the law.  
 A refusal to see law as the external solution for crises of violence provides a starting 
point from which to seek an alternative narrative for how a peaceful juridical order is 
produced. First, the relationship between law and violence escapes such an easy binary 
opposition. The War on Drugs is just one instance that illustrates how violence can be 
produced not through an absence or lack of law but by emerging from law itself and from 
attempts to enforce its regulations. Multiple forms of violence are performed every day 
through the law and its institutions. Rather than seeing law and violence as fixed in a rigid 
dichotomy, a rich tradition of legal scholarship has focused on the intimate relationship 
between law and violence.23 Richard Cover famously unveiled the violence of the law by 
declaring that “legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”24 Cover showed 
that it is this ability to inflict “pain and death” that gives law its authority. Law must be 
violent in order to take effect; without the ability to wield violence, the law is not the law. 
And yet violence cannot be the totality of what the law is, for if law were only violence, it 
would not invoke the reverence that the law requires.25 This paradox is taken up by Walter 
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence, ” which canonized the concept that legal violence 
possessed a distinguishing “mythical” quality. By mythical, Benjamin refers to the function 
of legal violence, which he sees as law-making or law-preserving.26 This imagining of the 
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nexus of law and violence as the establishment and/or sustaining of a determinate order has 
informed a tradition of jurisprudence that remains highly influential in critical legal studies. 
However, rather than merely concern itself with legal violence as only the inflicting of 
physical force through the word of the law, recent scholarship has illustrated the multiplicity 
of law’s violence. Violence informs law’s discourse as well as its actions, in the way law uses 
languages and representational practices to silence perspectives, the way it denies alternatives 
of experience, and the way it delimits legitimacy through its objectifying epistemology.27 To 
best appreciate the operation of violence within the contemporary legal order, I draw on these 
refined, discursive understandings of law’s violence in addition to the singular impact of 
law’s force. While the violence of the War on Drugs is often manifested as the visible 
exertion of force, this material violence is merely the superlative form of a preceding 
discursive violence, a construction of particular subjectivities that renders them naked before 
the ultimate material violence. These two dimensions of legal violence should not be 
separated: the material is, in itself, always already discursive. Material violence must reduce 
things beyond what they possibly could be, before it enacts force upon them. The material 
and the discursive are part of the same process of violence and it will be this process, over 
and above the inflicting of force (social/material death), that can be traced in both the legal 
structure of the drug war and its imaginings within popular culture. Furthermore, this 
violence operative through the law serves the function of constituting law-making in 
Benjaminian terms: of producing a legal order. In this article, I argue that the model for how 
legalized violence can be productive is found in the notion of sacrifice, a notion often 
confined to the pre-modern but that continues to maintain purchase within our presupposedly 
secularized modernity.  
 
Girard’s Theory Of Sacrifice 
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The above-detailed violence of the drug war is best read as a violence that actually 
constitutes, rather than destabilizes, law. To better appreciate this argument, it is necessary to 
unpack the notion of sacrifice, with particular reference to the operative role it plays in 
facilitating and sustaining community. The potency of sacrifice, specifically as a 
(re)generative mode of violence, is most clearly illuminated in the work of French 
anthropologist, philosopher, and literary critic René Girard. Initially through his engagements 
with literature and later through his fully realized theoretical works, Girard offers an 
expansive narrative about the origins of violence in community. By drawing on the grammar 
of the theological, he offers an elegant account of how the mechanism of legitimate violence 
allows a community to form while externalizing violence from within. Girard traces the ritual 
of sacrifice through the mythology and religions of human culture, reading its recurrence as 
betraying a subterranean mechanism for neutering the reciprocal violence that results from 
rivalry within any community. For Girard, the sacrificial ritual facilitates this catharsis by 
transferring that violence onto a legitimate victim, a victim that the community somehow 
justifies as deserving of violence.28 Girard’s schema suggests an alternative understanding of 
international law’s arrogation of a universal peace in the making of a community of nations.29 
Through his analyses, we can revisit the relationship between the production and renewal of 
the international legal order and an outbreak of violence—such as the War on Drugs—
considering how certain modes of violence may actually facilitate, rather than destabilize, the 
peace of the international community.  
 Girard’s model does not start from a presupposition of order as the normal state of 
social relations. Rather, he skillfully traces a structure in which conflict becomes the default 
condition that prefigures the emergence of community. He demonstrates that conflict exists 
as a-priori due to the mimetic quality of desire. In contrast to classical understandings of 
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desire as inherent to the human soul, tamed through engagement with the capacity for reason, 
Girard suggests instead that human desires are determined not by one’s own mind but in 
reflection of the desires of those others to whom we award the recognition of being. Upon 
perceiving the desire of another, the human subject comes to desire an object, thereby 
creating the figure of “the rival.” For Girard, rivalry is not a distorted manifestation of human 
relationship but instead could be said to form its basis, betraying the mimetic to be the 
primary impulse of the human.30 A structure is therefore set in place for perpetual, 
intensifying violence between all those who claim subjectivity. Rivalry, following desire, 
functions mimetically, and as a result, a state of crisis emerges that threatens to engulf all 
participants. A contagious cycle of violence materializes, multiplying as more and more 
subjects reflect each other by directing their desire toward the objects of contestation. 
Therefore, the basic requirement for a community to be established becomes the need for this 
intensifying violence to be quarantined. For Girard, this abiding peace is not achieved 
through a spontaneous truce. Rather, unanimity is only brought about by displacing the 
violence felt by rival for rival, onto a surrogate victim, a figure Girard names 
the“scapegoat.”31 The scapegoat is employed as a sacrificial substitute, tasked with absorbing 
the violence that has plagued the rival subjects and expunging this violence through its own 
sacrifice, thereby allowing a community to emerge. Sacrificial violence cordons off the 
eruption of the maleficent violence that promised only perpetual disorder. Girard illuminates 
the workings of this mechanism in clear detail: 
 
The violence directed against the surrogate victim might well be radically 
generative in that, by putting an end to the vicious and destructive cycle of 
violence, it simultaneously initiates another and constructive cycle, that of the 
sacrificial rite—which protects the community from that same violence and 
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allows culture to flourish.32 
 
For Girard, this act of legitimate violence serves as the prerequisite for any social order to 
emerge. The sacrificial mechanism must remain concealed in order to achieve this catharsis: 
if the act of violence is not seen to be justified, then it will merely add to the crescendo of 
violence emerging from the mimetic rivalry. Only when read by the social order as legitimate 
does the sacrifice of the scapegoat facilitate “the very real metamorphosis of reciprocal 
violence into restraining violence,” bringing about a societal mode of relations.33 However, 
following Girard, the externalization of violence onto the scapegoat creates as it destroys. 
While it removes the initial rivalry, it establishes paucity in the emergent social order’s 
ability to account for itself positively, allowing room for a periodical re-referral to that 
generative act of violence in order to ensure continuing cohesion. The bounding of violence 
also becomes an enabling of violence, since a particular category of violence becomes that 
which is (re)generative of the social order as a whole.34 Girard’s model for the emergence of 
a peaceful social order is an inviting lens through which to analyze international law’s 
relationship to an enacting of violence such as the War on Drugs. What this model 
illuminates is how the notion of sacrifice has been misunderstood. Sacrifice is not enacted in 
service of transcendent gods but in fact is an offering onto the social order that practices it 
itself. Particularly within our secularized modernity, constituted as devoid of an external, 
transcendent reference point such as a God, legitimate violence “becomes an ‘introverted’ 
sacrifice, a sacrifice to the perfected immanence of a now disenchanted world.”35 This 
understanding aids us in reconciling the way in which violence can be both produced through 
the law and be productive of the law. As the law posits itself as ontologically complete, it 
masks a crucial element of its being; it remains, at all times, dependent on a spectacular form 
of lawmaking violence, for “what the sustaining of modern law requires . . . is sacrifice.”36 
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Girard provokes the question of whether, for international law to constitute itself, it must 
allow room for a violence that will promote the cohesion and preservation of the legal 
order.37 
 Girard’s schema of community (re)generation though legitimate violence offers an 
alternative grounding for the international legal order. My move to filter a critical approach to 
international law through the Girardian model is not devoid of scholarly antecedents. Gregor 
Noll has most clearly drawn this link, between the paucity of international law’s ability to 
positively account for its own coming into being, and the subsequent room left for referral to 
a violence that (re)generates the society of states.38 It is in agreement with Noll, and 
following Girard, that I suggest that the international community’s movement, from being 
plagued by contagious, internal violence to the miraculous “peace” of the modern legal order, 
can be read through the mimetic violence between sovereign nations being displaced onto a 
hidden third term, a target structured to serve as a legitimate recipient for this violence: a 
scapegoat. Drawing on Girard directs the focus to the potential for conflict offered by an 
order of sovereign states that constitute themselves free from an overarching, transcendent 
point of authority. Girard understands rivalry as inherent in any social order and argues that 
any such order is only cohesive once that rivalry has been quelled. Transferring this model 
into an analysis of the international legal order offers an alternative answer to how this order 
constitutes and sustains itself: it does so through violence on a subject that is deemed to be a 
legitimate victim. Drawing a continuum from “rudimentary sacrificial rights” to “advanced 
judicial forms,” Girard sketches the persistence of a religious (in its broadest sense) 
orientation of law, which allows the workings of the sacrificial mechanism to function.39 Noll 
states this idea most clearly by suggesting that “If we follow Girard and read international 
law as religion, its incompleteness, its obscurity might be absolutely necessary for the law’s 
‘transcendental effectiveness’ in containing violence.”40 
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 The bind that ties members of the international community becomes one that must 
remain hidden so as to be effective. The circularity of its presumed grounding betrays an 
unprocessed element of the constitution of the international legal order: that the apparently 
miraculous unity among the constituents of the global legal order is produced and sustained 
by a subterranean violence. Girard points to this violence built into the making of the modern 
world order, which, in my view, persists in contemporary instantiations of legalized violence. 
Speaking to the closing of possibilities inherent in any claim to a single totalizing universal 
order, Girard states that “the history of modern society is marked by the dissolution of 
differences, that clearly has something to do with the sacrificial crisis. . . . Indeed, the phrase 
‘modern world’ seems almost like a synonym for ‘sacrificial crisis’.”41 The emergence of 
what we now call the international is coterminous with modernity’s birthing of the sovereign 
nation-state, a form of social ordering that proceeded to multiply and proliferate while 
escalating rivalry. Girard offers clarity regarding the location of the sacrificial mechanism 
within the modern world. Its work persists in “one of our social institutions above all: our 
judicial system.”42 Following modernity, the law functions to secularize the sacrificial ritual 
employed to expel contagious violence from the society. The law also inherits the obscurity 
required for the sacrificial mechanism to be effective, as Girard emphasizes: 
 
It is that enigmatic quality that pervades the judicial system when that system 
replaces sacrifice. This obscurity coincides with the transcendental 
effectiveness of a violence that is holy, legal, and legitimate successfully 
opposed to a violence that is unjust, illegal, and illegitimate.43  
 
This is an immediate challenge to the ideas of secular modernity on which law, including and 
perhaps especially international law, is presumed to rest. To view the international legal order 
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through Girard’s understanding of community formation illuminates the extent to which law 
remains hostage to the metaphysical grammar of the religious, in the broadest sense of the 
term. The modern claim to have drawn within itself the authority of the transcendent is 
disputed by this argument. Instead, I suggest, international law only appears as ontologically 
complete to the extent that it conceals the fact that that, as an order, it is fixed through an 
originating referral to violence. The violence remains concealed through being constructed as 
legitimate, thereby establishing a law that contains—in both senses of the word—the 
escalating violence that would otherwise infect society. The law contains violence (keeps it at 
bay) by containing violence (keeping it within). Oscar Guardiola-Rivera recognizes how this 
“foundational sacrifice” provides international law its “prescriptive force” stating: 
 
Group survival is seen in the context of the predominant doxa as necessarily 
desirable and violence appears paradoxical: violent conflict, often seen as a 
foreign element threatening group survival, is necessarily undesirable and 
must be contained by means of . . . violence.44 
 
Understanding international law’s indeterminacy as necessarily obscuring the continued 
reference to a pre-modern, sacred violence aids my attempt to reconcile the violence declared 
by the law—exemplified in this article by the War on Drugs—with the maintenance of order.  
 
Sicario and The Cinematic Depiction of Sacrificial Violence 
 
That the impossible legal project to enforce drug prohibitions offers an ideal setting through 
which to explore these tensions between law, order and violence has not escaped the attention 
of popular culture. A recent representation of the way in which spectacular violence can be 
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exercised through the law in drug war is the 2015 film by Denis Villeneuve, Sicario. This 
film tells the story of an FBI field agent, Kate Mercer (played by Emily Blunt), who, after 
distinguishing herself through uncovering a particular gruesome safe house for a Mexican 
drug cartel, is recruited to serve in a nefarious, multi-agency drug enforcement operation. The 
FBI agent, while remaining confused about the exact nature and jurisdictional basis under 
which this operation is functioning, maintains enough faith in the inherent goodness of the 
efforts to enforce anti-drug laws that she complies with her superiors’ directions despite her 
doubts. However, as the operation unfolds, the protagonist’s moral anchor begins to come 
unmoored as she better appreciates that the violence that she and her colleagues are licensed 
to execute is not aiding in the creation of a “drug-free world” but instead reinforcing the 
coherent order of the status quo. An explicit recognition of the impossibility of the stated aim 
of the drug laws—to eradicate the supply, use, and trade of prohibited substances—is offered 
to Mercer at the end of the film by the defense contractor, Matt Graver (played by Josh 
Brolin), who initially invited her into this elite drug enforcement unit. When Mercer’s faith in 
the project is conclusively shattered and she asks why the enforcement agency privillages 
violence over prohibition, Graver responds, “Until someone finds a way to stop 20 percent of 
America putting this shit up their nose, order is the best we can hope for”45 	   Ultimately, the central antagonism driving the story—the conflict between the major 
narcotraficantes and the various agencies responsible for American drug enforcement—does 
not resolve itself; instead, the film concludes with the traffic of narcotics persisting at much 
the same level as before, only now through a different set of hands. However, a simple 
recognition of the futility of the drug war leaves unaccounted the violence we have seen 
visited upon the often nameless victims throughout the story. The expendable nature of the 
human victims caught in the crossfire of the drug war is illuminated at several moments 
throughout the movie. Discarded bodies populate the landscape over which the film takes 
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place, with a particularly haunting scene occurring when Mercer (and the audience via her 
perspective) is introduced to Juárez, driving into the city to be greeted by the sight of bodies 
of drug war victims hanging in the street. Scholars have read the sacrificial nature of public 
lynching as the essential element distinguishing this spectacular mode of violence.46 The 
performative nature of lynching as a form of execution is what allows it to be (re)generative 
of the social order at large. As opposed to disturbing the peace of a functional social order, 
lynching is actually performed to reconstitute the peace. The cathartic power of such 
executions is dependent on the construction of the victims. Lynching is linked to purification: 
in order for its operative function to be realized, the victims—scapegoats, in Girard’s 
description—must already be discursively constructed as an infestation that pollutes the 
social order. Their deaths thereby become a public declaration that the threat to the social 
order has been extinguished. The spectacular nature of this performative execution erases the 
innocence of the victims. The sacrificial dynamic underwriting the public lynching is 
acknowledged within the dialogue of Sicario when a fellow drug enforcement agent explains 
to Kate Mercer the purpose of the hanging, mutilated bodies: “When they mutilate a body 
like that, they make people think that they must have been involved, they must have deserved 
such a death because they did something.”47	  	   Due to the construction of the victims as deserving of their fate, the violence upon 
them does not disturb the cohesion of the community. This exemplifies the ontological 
violence that precedes the material inflicting of force and constitutes it as (re)generative in 
Girard’s sense. The same dynamic of the erasure of innocence through the spectacularization 
of violence is present again later in the film when the drug enforcement agents use lethal 
force on a group of narcotraficantes that they pursue out of Juárez. Stuck in a traffic jam 
along the Mexican-American border, the agents decide to pre-emptively confront and then 
execute suspected drug gang members driving in a trailing car. After the encounter, the shock 
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of the visibly shaken protagonist is dismissed out of hand by the flippancy of two of the 
experienced agents as they discuss the issue among themselves:	  	  
Agent 1: This is going to be on the front page of every newspaper in America?	  
Agent 2: No it won’t, this won’t even make the papers in El Paso.48 	  	  
Mercer, who again serves as the lens through which the audience views the realities of the 
drug war, is confronted through her exposure to this conversation with the way in which the 
narcotraficantes have already been constructed as legitimate victims; as such, their deaths 
will not disturb social order and thereby attract media coverage. As with any infestation, their 
deaths are not only welcome, but already predetermined. 	  	  
“The Beast”—Ciudad Juárez  	  
In Sicario, it is not only particular people who are shown to be ontologically constructed as 
naked to violence; an entire city is subjected to the same discursive practices. Stalking the 
film is the construction of Ciudad Juárez, both its territory and its inhabitants, as a sphere of 
legitimate violence. The drift over the border functions as a drift into the space beyond the 
line, where different rules apply. Juárez—referred to by drug enforcement agents in the film 
as “The Beast’—operates as a sphere in which the agents are not restrained by the checks-
and-balances they are usually subject to. However, this construction of Juárez as a place 
beyond the line should not be taken as an affirmation of the commonly-held assumption that 
areas like Juárez function as “lawless’; Juárez remains very much within the panoramic gaze 
of the law. Taking seriously the Giradian insights into the construction of social orders, 
Juárez can be better understood as included within the global legal order but only as a deviant 
	   17	  
element. It must be within that global legal order so that the latter will have the universality it 
accredits itself with; this inclusion is evident in the way jurisdictional national boundaries are 
functionally erased in the operations of the enforcement agents. At the same time, however, 
Juárez must also be outside the legal order for the violence that we witness taking place 
within its borders to be justified. Once again, this inclusive/exclusive positionality concords 
with Girard’s theorization of the scapegoat, which “should belong both to the inside and the 
outside of the community.”49 In order to produce such a subject, a discourse must be offered 
that rationalizes a subject to be both like and unlike the community: a distortion of the model, 
a failed realization of what the community should be. It is through this discursive process that 
the goal of making “the victim wholly sacrificeable” is satisfied.50 Traversing the boundaries 
of the global legal order, Juárez and its inhabitants, in Sicario, find themselves exposed to a 
cathartic violence through being both similar enough and different enough to absorb the 
sacrificial violence and transform it into being re-generative of the wider order.  
 Villeneuve’s film, although fictional, struck a chord with audiences with its depiction 
of the dynamics that produce death and destruction in the epicenter of the drug war in the 
twenty-first century. However, an element underexplored by Sicario is the economic 
conditions that aid in the ontological construction of Ciudad Juárez and its citizens as naked 
to the law’s sacrificial violence. The global legal order is always coterminous with the 
globalized market of exchange, enshrined in the twenty-first century through neoliberal trade 
agreements, of which the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is perhaps the 
exemplar par excellence. With NAFTA facilitating the erasure of the economic border 
between the U.S. and Mexico for the purpose of the free exchange of goods and services, the 
City of Juárez emerged as the principal site for México's export economy. Deborah 
Weissman further illuminates this point when she explains that “geography is central to Cd. 
Juárez's standing as a location from which to understand the consequences of the maquila 
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[assembly plant] development strategies.”51 The proximity of Juárez to the American border 
aids the transformation of the city into a terrain of transience and contingency, a condition 
necessary for sacrifice. Juárez’s location means that it is subject to a gravitational pull from 
the U.S. that gradually erodes the structures and institutions that would otherwise guarantee 
its subjectivity. Juárez becomes a city whose subjectivity is determined vis-à-vis its 
relationship with America, with tens of thousands of migrants traveling into the city 
annually.52 This transience and precariousness is invited by the economic imperative to create 
the necessary conditions for a successful free trade zone along the border. Consequently, 
however, the social structure in Juárez has suffered significant shifts and dislocation.53 
Overall income levels have fallen sharply, while disparities in wealth have expanded, making 
the instability of inequality the norm. The expanding population means that unemployment in 
Juárez has only increased “even as maquilas have created jobs in the export zone.”54 The 
impact of neoliberalization has transformed the city into a polis with a sacrificial status 
before the global legal and economic order. Prior to the impact of neoliberalization in the 
1990s, “Ciudad Juárez was considered a reasonably safe place; it is now known as a social 
disaster and one of the most distressed urban areas in the Western Hemisphere.” 55 This 
devastation is evident not only in the explosion of material violence depicted in Sicario but 
also in the accompanying rise of “environmental degradation and sprawling squatter 
settlements inhabited by a rapidly increasing migrant population.” 56  
 Juarez’s transformation is also what has allowed it to become the epicenter for the 
ever-growing industry of narcotics traffic. The same conditions that make a location a 
desirable center for the free exchange of commodity goods across formal jurisdictional 
boundaries also make it a place where illegal commodities can be smuggled along with 
legitimate ones. Juárez has now become synonymous with the drug war, and as the point of 
connection between the drug-producing countries of Latin America and the world’s largest 
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drug consumption market, the U.S, it was always going to be a consequence of NAFTA that 
there would be a surplus of illegal commerce generated, along with the desired legitimate 
trade. The potential wealth offered by the drug trade combined with the insecurity of an 
unemployed and transient population only amplifies the likelihood of an antagonism between 
the global economic imperative for free trade and the global legal imperative for prohibition 
of drugs.57 The impact of NAFTA has contributed to the transformation not only of Juárez, 
but also of Mexico into a fragile state. The agricultural reforms demanded of Mexico by 
neoliberal economic dogma in order to dismantle what was seen as inefficient protectionism 
has divided up communal lands under the premise of making them more competitive, leading 
to falling prices for produce and rising unemployment. Farmers began turning to narcotics 
production to sustain their income, moving into a sector with greater potential profit returns 
and competitive advantages over global rivals—a shift that is, ironically, in complete 
alignment with neoliberal economic principles.58 Narcotics then become yet another product 
that is transported through Ciudad Juárez to satisfy the demand of the U.S., the same nation 
that then levies violence on Juárez in order to purify the world of drugs and drug traffickers, 
the declared illegitimate element of the desired global economic order.  
 
The Sacrificial Rule of Law 
 
Despite mirroring the Girardian critique of sacrificial legal violence that I outline above, 
Sicario ultimately concludes, however, by detaching the violence witnessed over the course 
of the film with the inner workings of the law. At the end of the film, kieeping in place the 
dichotomy between law and violence that was outlined earlier in this article, Matt Graver’s 
partner Alejandro Gillick (Benicio del Toro) tells Kate Mercer that if she can’t handle the 
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lawlessness of drug enforcement, she should try other careers: “You should move to a small 
town, somewhere the rule of law still exists.”59 
 However, what Alejandro overlooks is that Sicario does not depict the lawlessness of 
the drug war but instead illuminates and exposes the full workings of the law. The actions of 
the drug enforcement agents are lawful in their depiction of the fullness of legal ordering. 
The rule of law contains within it the violence that has been experienced over the course of 
the film’s narrative, only it contains this violence in an oppositional relationality within itself. 
The presumption that the rule of law equates to an order of peace ignores the extent to which 
historic crimes such as transatlantic slavery or “the Scramble for Africa” were carried out not 
in a vacuum of law but through the law and its workings. When the modern international 
legal order presents itself as a global mechanism projecting global equality of justice, it not 
only forgets the history of law’s imperial character, but it also forgets that an extension of the 
rule of law does not necessitate an extension of justice. Throughout history, law and justice, 
in their extension, have often operated in separate, binary spheres, as Ugo Mattei and Laura 
Nader have demonstrated.60 Mattei and Nader place what they term the “imperial rule of law” 
within this tradition, describing how the colonial powers would use law “as propaganda to 
allow the claiming of resources as a legal right as instead of its true condition, that of 
plunder.”61 This article is driven by an aim to extend Mattei and Nader’s concept of an 
imperial rule of law to a theory of a sacrificial rule of law, one that can account for the 
violence that the law visits through the drug war on areas like Ciudad Juárez.  
 
The Geo-Epistemology of Sacrifice in The Drug War 
 
Juárez and its inhabitants function as a particularly drastic example of the sacrificial violence 
of the drug war, but this is not an isolated example. Other areas have suffered the same fate. 
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In the Juárez depicted in Sicario, there is a consistent element that connects many of these 
regions. Only the most myopic of observers could ignore the asymmetrical apportioning of 
drug war violence among the peoples of the world. Despite adopting a liberal posture and 
being couched in terms of the impartiality and universality claimed of law, the international 
laws on drugs have disproportionately impacted specific categories and territories of peoples. 
First, the international laws on drugs provide an archetypal instantiation of the Western-Non-
Western dichotomy that Third World Approaches to International Law scholars have 
identified within the universal promise of international law.62 The impetus behind 
international law’s prohibition of drugs came from the desire of Western nations (with the 
U.S. providing the initial driving force) to control the growing demand for psychoactive 
substances among their populations. Yet a close reading of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs treaty of 1961 shows that the “schedules of control” detailing which drugs 
would be prohibited and how were drafted in a structure that discriminates against the 
interests of producers and suppliers in areas such as Mexico.63 The treaty paid particular 
attention to the plant-based drugs that were produced and had long histories of use in non-
Western nations (opium, heroin, coca, cocaine, cannabis) instead of the synthetic substances 
being produced in the West. What was universalized in the Single Convention was a 
particularly occidental conception of what constitutes “health and welfare.”64 The cultural use 
of many of the prohibited substances was considered quotidian in non-Western societies. As 
a result, the violence unleashed following international law’s declaration of the universal 
prohibition of those drugs has particularly affected Latin America, the Caribbean, and the 
racially subaltern populations of Europe and the U.S. 
 These are the subjects who have been primarily exposed to the violence of the law 
through the War on Drugs that I argue functions as sacrificial. As detailed above, in order for 
the sacrificial mechanism to function, the scapegoat must be constructed as a figure upon 
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which violence can be licensed in order to produce a commonality among rivals. The 
construction of the scapegoat must be such that it reads as familiar enough to expunge 
violence from the community, yet foreign enough for its sacrifice to appear justified.65 Girard 
details the categories that sacrificial victims must occupy: “neither outside nor inside the 
community, but marginal to it . . . situated . . . between the inside and the outside, they can 
perhaps be said to belong to both the interior and the exterior of the community.”66 The 
victim is inside the order, so as to absorb the spiraling violence that threatens to destroy the 
entire community, and yet also outside of it, so that there remains a perceived discontinuity 
between the victim and the community, allowing the sacrifice to be expunged, rather than 
perpetuated.67 With the global legal order, the universal triumph of a shared rule of law that is 
celebrated by proclamations of “the end of history” is tied to a particular Western conception 
of the universal. Those who are outside this conception due to being non-Western while 
simultaneously being within it insofar as it is universal are rendered within its internal logic 
as subjects occupying the necessary inclusive/exclusive position for the Giradian sacrifice.  
 Therefore, returning to the empirical level, we can see how the enforcement of the 
drug prohibition in spheres of legitimate violence such as the city of Juárez, or parallel areas 
such as the favelas of Brazil or the ghettos of America, has licensed the construction of these 
zones based on their imputed non-being and on the juridical categorization of their residents 
as legitimate victims. As Denise Ferreira Da Silva states when talking of the favelas of 
Brazil, the inhabitants of these spheres of legitimate violence are exposed to the force of law 
“whether or not they are involved in drug trafficking,” and their suffering does not disturb the 
cohesiveness of law but instead is read as jus necessitates for the preservation of order.68 
Ultimately, in reading the legacy of drug prohibition across these regions, only the most 
wilfully blind of observers could ignore the racial and geographical discrepancies in the 
application of the law.  




The critical reading of the War on Drugs in this article represents an under-researched topic. 
However, scholars have engaged with the related War on Terror on similar terms, noting the 
latter’s similar licensing of violence on an undiagnosed third-term in response to intra-
communal rivalry.69 Robert Knox correctly notes that the “racial” discourse underlying 
humanitarian interventions in the War on Terror cannot simply be read as a process of  
“othering” but functions as a response to inter-imperialist rivalry.70 Knox recasts the legal 
basis of the War on Terror, characterizing it as driven by rivalry: setting up the structure for a 
legitimate act of violence to contain this rivalry before an engulfing of the community. The 
same dynamic is what I argue is also operant within the War on Drugs, a legal project that 
previewed many of the tactics later employed in the War on Terror. This article aims to 
address the lack of attention to the War on Drugs by scholars concerned with the relationship 
between law and violence, particularly in comparison to the wealth of juridical scholarship 
that has been generated by, or has attempted to speak to, the War on Terror. The drug war 
provides a telling instance in which the workings of legal ordering can be examined. 
Sacrificial violence plays an essential role in this process of legal ordering, following 
Girard’s theory of law and sacrifice. Once the global drug war is recast as a project concerned 
with resolving contagious violence, the Girardian corollary would anticipate the production 
of a sacrificial victim on whom violence could be licensed in order to contain the exploding 
rivalry. In order to produce such a subject, a discourse must be offered that rationalizes a 
subject to be both alike and unlike the community: a distortion of the model, a failed 
realization of what should be. It is through this process that the goal of making “the victim 
wholly sacrifceable” is satisfied.71 As outlined above, the discursive construction of Ciudad 
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Juárez and it inhabitants imbues the region with the subjective qualities required of the 
Giradian victim. With popular culture reflecting this dynamic of violence, valuable insight 
into the workings of the drug war, and by extension the sacrificial structure of legal ordering, 
can be gained from reading the ontological and material violence depicted in Denis 
Villeneuve’s Film Sicario through this theoretical lens.  
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